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I. THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE  
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION  
A. TWO CASES, ONE THEME  
Exactly one year apart, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two cases 
on “class arbitration” proceedings, one about international shipping 
and the other on consumer purchases of mobile telephones. Each 
decision inflicted damage on a claimant’s right to invoke collective 
action in arbitrations. Read together, the opinions serve as a prism 
through which to refract key elements in an increasingly politicized 
debate on the legal framework for arbitration, particularly within the 
United States. 
In Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, an arbitral tribunal had been 
constituted to hear antitrust claims arising from maritime agreements 
for transport of liquids such as food oils and chemicals.1 Asked to 
interpret a series of charter parties negotiated by experienced 
business managers, the tribunal rendered a unanimous award saying 
that the contract language permitted class proceedings. Having 
determined that the agreements authorized class arbitration, the 
arbitrators’ next job would have been to determine whether the case 
should in fact go forward on that basis, an exercise involving 
evaluation of various criteria, such as the existence of common 
questions of law and fact, relevant to the appropriateness of class 
rather than bilateral action. Only then would the tribunal proceed to 
rule on the merits of the claims. 
The arbitrators never got the chance to take the next steps, 
however. A majority of the Supreme Court decided that by 
 
 1. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
Opinion by Justice Alito joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy. 
Dissent by Justice Ginsburg joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens. Justice 
Sotomayor took no part in the case, having been on the Second Circuit during the 
appeal, but later joined the dissenters in another decision about arbitral jurisdiction, 
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). This latter case did not involve 
class proceedings, but rather allocation of authority between arbitrators and courts 
in deciding the validity of an arbitration clause in an employment contract that the 
worker said was unconscionable. An opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by Justices 
Roberts, Alito, Thomas and Kennedy, held the challenge to be a matter for the 
arbitrator. A dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and 
Sotomayor, argued that the matter lay within the purview of courts. 
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construing the contracts as having authorized class arbitration, the 
arbitral tribunal exceeded its authority. The award was then 
remanded to the lower court to be vacated.2 For the majority, 
respondents’ failure to consent to class proceedings trumped any 
efficiency benefits from collective arbitration such as the sharing of 
costs that might otherwise inhibit pursuit of claims. 
Twelve months later, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the same 
Court addressed arbitration arising from a federal court action 
brought by consumers against the manufacturer of cellular 
telephones.3 The standard-form sales contracts provided for 
arbitration, but prohibited class proceedings. Relying on an earlier 
California judicial ruling striking down such prohibitions as 
unconscionable, the lower federal courts refused to compel 
arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed on the basis that state rules 
barring class action waivers ran afoul of federal law.4  
Vigorous dissents were issued in each instance. In Stolt-Nielsen 
the dissenters contended that the arbitral process had not yet reached 
a point ripe for judicial review. Moreover, the arbitrators were 
simply doing what the parties instructed them when designating the 
AAA Supplementary Rules on Class Arbitration as the framework 
for the arbitration. In AT&T Mobility, the dissent authored by Justice 
Breyer stressed the advantages of class arbitration, and argued that 
the California rule on waivers fell within the role accorded to state 
 
 2.  A federal district court had initially vacated the award for “manifest 
disregard of the law,” but was then reversed by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Although accepting that “manifest disregard” existed as a ground for 
annulment, the Court of Appeals considered that the standard had not been met 
under the facts of the instant case. 
 3. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Justice Scalia 
delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Roberts, Alito, Thomas and 
Kennedy. The dissent by Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor and Kagan. Following Stolt-Nielsen, Justice Kagan had been appointed 
by President Obama to succeed Justice Stevens, who had earlier expressed serious 
concerns about arbitration in a dissent in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 666 (1985). 
 4. AT&T Mobility at 1753. The majority’s reasoning was adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit in Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass’n, 637 F.3d 947 (2012), in which the court 
held that a California law prohibiting arbitration of claims for public injunctive 
relief was not a ground that “exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract,” and was accordingly preempted to the extent that it purported to 
invalidate agreements to arbitrate such claims. 
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law in determining the validity of arbitration agreements.  
The comment triggered by these cases has explored the dispute 
resolution’s fairness, a capacious notion that incorporates a 
responsibility to hear before deciding (due process), respect for the 
contours of arbitral jurisdiction (whether imposed by contract or 
public policy) and the general duty of impartiality and 
independence.5 Controversy has addressed not only the fairness of 
the format for adjudication, whether collective or bilateral, but also 
that of the forum, whether public courts or private arbitration.6  
B. POLITICS AND JUDICIAL ATTITUDES 
The ideological overtones of these two decisions will not escape 
careful observers, aware of how class arbitration in the United States 
tends to implicate passions associated with “business vs. consumer” 
conflicts. Indeed, shortly after AT&T Mobility, the New York Times 
carried a scathing editorial describing the decision as “a devastating 
blow to consumer rights” that would “bar many Americans from 
enforcing their rights in court [and in many cases] from enforcing 
rights at all.”7 
In the context of current American political debate, four of the five 
judges striking down the award in Stolt-Nielsen, and confirming the 
class waivers in AT&T Mobility, would be described as conservative: 
Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia and Thomas.8 The dissents came from 
Court members all of whom would be considered to the left of those 
in the majority: Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer and Sotomayor, 
along with Justice Kagan, whom President Obama appointed to 
 
 5. See generally William W. Park, Les devoirs de l’arbitre: ni un pour tous, ni 
tous pour un, 2011 CAHIERS DE L’ARBITRAGE 13 (2011). 
 6.  See generally Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: 
The New Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435 (2011); Thomas J. Stipanowich, 
The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the 
Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323 (2011). See also 
Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-
Mart v. Dukes and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011), exploring 
class proceedings in court as well as arbitration. 
 7. Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, 12 May 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/opinion/13fri1.html. 
 8. In each case they were joined by Justice Kennedy, often deemed a centrist 
swing vote. 
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succeed Justice Stevens after his retirement. 
Normally inclined to endorse arbitration as consistent with 
freedom of contract,9 the right side of the American political 
spectrum remains skeptical about class proceedings, seen as a tool of 
lawyers taking cases on a contingency basis for a portion of the 
judgment or settlement. By contrast, for those thought of as leaning 
to the left politically, class actions present themselves as a 
mechanism to promote consumer and employment claims which, 
because of the small individual recovery, might not otherwise be 
brought either in court or in arbitration.  
Support of class action arbitration does not necessarily mean 
satisfaction with arbitration itself. Within the United States, 
complaints against arbitration of consumer and employment disputes 
have been raised not only by journalists, but also by legal scholars in 
popular as well as academic literature. Arbitration has often been 
portrayed as a way to sidestep the perceived safeguards of a civil jury 
in favor of more “pro-business” arbitrators.10 A quarter century ago, 
in the landmark Mitsubishi decision allowing arbitration of anti-trust 
claims, a dissent by Justice Stevens declared that “[c]onsideration of 
 
 9.  For comment on arbitration by a scholar usually associated with the “law 
and economics” movement, see Eric A Posner, Arbitration and the Harmonization 
of International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 647 (1999). See also Eric A 
Posner, Should International Arbitration Awards be Reviewable, 94 AM. SOCIETY 
INT’L LAW PROC. 126 (2000), suggesting that courts “should not review arbitration 
awards except to ensure that arbitrators have jurisdiction and do not violate 
mandatory legal rules.” Professor Posner continues that nothing in his analysis 
turns on whether arbitrators are better or worse than courts sin general, but rather 
what is important is that “parties have the freedom to choose between arbitration 
and courts.” In what appears as an article of faith he adds, “If they have this 
freedom, they will simply choose the superior forum.” Id. 
 10. See Amalia D. Kessler, Op-Ed., Stuck in Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, 7 March 
2012, at A27. Professor Kessler argues that “arbitration decisions do not need to be 
based on the law; arbitrators have their own procedures, and some studies have 
found that they are systematically biased in favor of the companies that hire them,” 
and that “ordinary citizens are increasingly being forced into arbitration under the 
guise of free contract.” Id. Compare Thomas Stipanowich, The Arbitration 
Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and 
Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Consumer 
Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985, 991 (2012), in which the author proposes “a 
public rating system assessing the fairness of arbitration programs associated with 
contracts for consumer goods or services, or individual employment contracts—
what we call an ‘Arbitration Fairness Index.’” 
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a fully developed record by a jury, instructed in the law by a federal 
judge, and subject to appellate review, is a surer guide to the 
competitive character of a commercial practice than the practically 
unreviewable judgment of a private arbitrator.”11 
Resistance to arbitration from the liberal side of the aisle has also 
worked its way into legislation reducing the vitality of arbitration 
clauses in consumer and employment contracts.12 Notably, the 
pending Arbitration Fairness Act provides that “no pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires 
arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, or civil 
rights dispute.”13 The bill’s preamble includes a proposed finding 
that “decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States have 
changed the meaning of the [Federal Arbitration] Act” so that it now 
extends to consumer and employment disputes in a way that 
“undermines the development of public law because there is 
inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of 
arbitrators’ decisions.”14 
Politicization of arbitration in the United States derives in large 
measure from two idiosyncrasies of American legal culture. The first 
lies in the absence of any general nation-wide statute to insulate 
consumers and employees from abusive arbitration arrangements. 
The second rests in the availability of civil juries to decide ordinary 
contract cases. Arbitration thus commends itself to those with doubts 
about the reliability of such juries, often perceived as rendering 
unreasonable verdicts tainted with bias against manufacturers and 
employers.15  
 
 11.  Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 666 (1985). 
 12.  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223. See also Department of Defense 
Regulation Restricting the Use of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 48 C.F.R. 
§§ 212, 222, 252 (2010). 
 13. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. § 402 (introduced 12 
May 2011 by Sen. Franken). See also Department of Defense Regulation 
Restricting the Use of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 48 C.F.R. §§ 212, 222, 
252 (2010). 
 14. Id. 
 15. For an intriguing case on the law applicable to determination of whether 
class actions are permissible even outside the arbitration context, see Shady Gove 
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
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With greater or lesser degrees of nuance, political scientists and 
journalists attempt to chart the ideology on judicial decisions, in the 
sense that certain judges tend to vote together.16 The so-called 
“Martin-Quinn Scores” use a scale with negative numbers translating 
to liberalism and positive numbers translating to conservatism. Thus 
Justice Douglas, considered a very liberal judge, received an average 
ideological score of minus 4, while a score of positive 4.30 was 
accorded the conservative Justice Rehnquist.17  
Less successful has been the establishment of any intellectually 
rigorous way to connect the dots among the disparate questions that 
work their way into the right-left debate, such as criminal procedure, 
competition law, health care, taxes, gun control, a Christmas crèche 
on the village green, campaign finance, affirmative action, gay 
marriage, and abortion. Notions of being a “fiscal” rather than a 
“social” conservative, which appeal to many Americans, provide 
some refinement on the theme, while still leaving open what exactly 
makes a position left or right.18  
 
 16. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). Explaining the “attitudinal” 
model of Supreme Court decisions, the authors venture, “Simply put, Rehnquist 
votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the 
way he did because he was extremely liberal.” Id. at 86. For a journalist’s take, see 
Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html? 
pagewanted=all.  
 17. See generally Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn, & Lee Epstein, The Median 
Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005); Lee Epstein, 
Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn & Jeffrey Segal, Ideological Drift among Supreme 
Court Justices: Who, When and How Important, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007); 
Lee Epstein, Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 99 (2008). For 
comment on the Martin-Quinn scores, see Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of 
Martin-Quinn Scores to Asses Supreme Court Justices, with Special Attention to 
the Problem of Ideological Draft, 101 NW. L. REV. 1891 (2007). See also Ward 
Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal 
Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67 (2005). 
 18. Traditionally, American conservatives would have seen themselves as 
cautious toward change, claiming hallmarks of small government and free 
enterprise as exemplified in classic works by William F. Buckley (GOD AND MAN 
AT YALE, 1952) and Barry Goldwater (CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE, 1960). 
By contrast, liberal figures such as Kingman Brewster and William Sloane Coffin 
would claim trademarks as advocates for greater social and economic equality. See 
generally Geoffrey Kabaservice, THE GUARDIANS (2004); Warren Goldstein, 
WILLIAM SLONE COFFIN JR. (2004). Of course, such characterizations suffer in the 
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Likewise, it is less than self-evident how such inclinations have 
come to figure so prominently in the area of arbitration, with its 
protean quality of changing from context to context. The choice to 
arbitrate, rather than proceed to otherwise competent courts, justifies 
itself differently depending on whether the final and binding private 
adjudication relates to labor disputes, construction contracts, 
commercial transactions, international finance, or investor 
allegations of host state expropriation, to mention just a few of 
arbitration’s incarnations.  
The elusiveness of political categories in arbitration also manifests 
itself through inter-temporal shifts from one generation to another. A 
half century ago, liberal judges tended to wax eloquent about the 
benefits of arbitration, in the context of labor disputes19 or 
construction cases,20 providing many “pro-arbitration” passages that 
have since become locus classicus. In all instances, labels remain 
highly sensitive to cultural and geographical context. The bar to 
arbitration of consumer disputes, while radical in the United States, 
has long been the norm in Europe.21  
The complexity of arbitration’s political ideology also presented 
itself in the investor-state dispute resolution provisions of the U.S.-
 
current world of “neoconservatives” and the Occupy Wall Street movement, with 
some traditional conservatives lamenting a movement hijacked by oversimplified 
capitalism and imprudent foreign adventure, and some on the left worrying that 
protest movements lack focused programs. 
 19. See the opinions by Justice Douglas, a classic liberal, in the “pro-
arbitration” decisions in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 
U.S. 448 (1957) and the so-called “Steelworkers Trilogy,” which includes United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564; United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574; United Steelworkers of Am. v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
 20. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Construction, 460 U.S. 1 
(1983), where Justice Brennan, considered a liberal, wrote for the majority which 
ordered arbitration, while the dissent was penned by Justice Rehnquist, a 
conservative. 
 21. The European Union has long restricted consumer arbitration. European 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC, implemented through national legislation such as 
the English Arbitration Act of 1996, §§ 89-91. Even apart from the EU Directive, 
many European countries restrict consumer arbitration by statute. In France, a pre-
dispute clause compromissoire (contrasted to the post-dispute compromis) has long 
been valid only as between merchants (commerçants) or persons contracting with 
respect to a professional activity. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2061 (Fr.). 
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Korean Free Trade Agreement, contested by the South Korean left 
but likely to appear progressive to those living north of the 38th 
parallel.22 After the ruling conservative Saenuri Party succeeded in 
having the Free Trade Agreement adopted in late 2011, the more 
liberal opposition proposed renegotiation of the treaty’s investor-
state arbitration provisions, arguing that arbitration’s alleged 
impartiality was more illusion than reality. 23 
C. ENTER INVESTOR PROTECTION  
A few months after the decision in AT&T Mobility, the tribunal in 
an international arbitration known as Abaclat rendered a 
jurisdictional award which wrestled with similar questions about 
class arbitration.24 The claims had been brought by an association 
acting as agent for approximately sixty thousand Italian 
bondholders,25 including some added after the claims were initially 
filed, dissatisfied by Argentine debt restructuring following the 2001 
economic crisis.  
Filed pursuant to the Italian-Argentine investment treaty, the 
 
 22. See generally Chung Min-uck, Opposition Pledges to Scrap KORUS FTA 
After Taking Power, KOR. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/ 
www/news/nation/2012/02/116_104431.html.  
 23. Discussion focused inter alia on the 1998 NAFTA arbitration in the 
Loewen case, which rejected a Canadian request for compensation in connection 
with a Mississippi state court trial generally considered xenophobic from start to 
finish. One Korean press report cited political pressure on Abner Mikva, an 
arbitrator in the Loewen case, by a U.S. Justice Department official who suggested 
that the arbitral tribunal should deny liability because “if we [the United States] 
lose this case we would lose NAFTA.” Jung Eun-joo, Unearthed Documents 
Illustrate Pitfalls of ISD Clause, HANKYOREH, 3 January 2012, English.hani.co.kr/. 
On Loewen, see generally William W. Park & Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, The 
New Face of Investment Arbitration, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (2003). 
 24. Abaclat & Others (formerly Giovanna A Beccara & Others) v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB 07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
majority opinion by Pierre Tercier and Albert Jan van den Berg, 4 August 2011; 
dissent by Georges Abi-Saab, 28 October 2011. As is well-known to those familiar 
with investor state arbitration, awards rendered pursuant to the rule of International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, a World Bank affiliate, are often 
published with consent of the parties. 
 25.  The Associazione per la Tutela degli Investitori in Titoli Argentini, often 
called “Task Force Argentina” (or TFA) filed its claim on 14 September 2006. For 
procedural reasons a Registration Notice by the ICSID Secretariat did not follow 
until November 7, 2007. 
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Abaclat case took a different direction from the U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions. The majority took jurisdiction over the collectively-filed 
claims, while the dissenting arbitrator expressed concerns about the 
appropriateness of such proceedings.26 Citing both Stolt-Nielsen and 
AT&T Mobility, the dissent endorsed the reasoning in both judgments 
as underscoring the fundamental differences between bilateral and 
class representative proceedings, which, he wrote, required some 
“special consent of the parties” not to be assumed from a simple 
commitment to arbitrate.27 
International arbitration between investors and host states 
implicates a shift in the political labels of those for or against class 
proceedings. Financial interests, considered as relatively 
conservative in the sense of resisting uncompensated governmental 
takings, urge investor-state arbitration beyond the traditional bilateral 
paradigm. Any jurisdictional risks stemming from the atypical 
dynamics of class proceedings seem outweighed by the prospect of 
enhancing the vindication of contract rights. 
In Abaclat the majority saw the “mass action” not as a matter not 
of jurisdiction, but rather of procedural “admissibility” presenting 
few comparisons to American-style class-action arbitration. The 
majority emphasized that the tribunal had jurisdiction over each 
individual claim, and found that no separate, specific consent 
required with regard to the form of the proceeding. According to the 
majority, “Assuming that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the 
claims of several individual Claimants, it is difficult to conceive why 
and how the Tribunal could [lose] such jurisdiction where the 
number of Claimants outgrows a certain threshold.”28  
D. TAXONOMY: CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATION AND JOINDER  
For American and non-American audiences alike, confusion may 
exist between “class” and “consolidated” arbitration.29 The former 
 
 26. Abaclat & Others (formerly Giovanna A Beccara & Others) v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB 07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
(Aug. 4, 2011). 
 27. Id. Abi-Saab Dissent, ¶¶ 150-53. 
 28. Id. Majority Award, ¶ 490. 
 29. On the distinction between consolidated and class proceedings, see 
generally Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. 
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would normally be contemplated when stakes in any individual case 
remain small enough to make bilateral arbitration impractical from a 
cost standpoint. By contrast, consolidation implicates several cases 
each of which would proceed on a stand-alone basis, but which 
present related parties as well as common issues of law and fact, 
making it more economical for the claims to be heard together by a 
single tribunal.  
In “class” arbitration, self-selected claimants represent others 
entitled to similar or analogous recovery. Assuming the relevant 
contract language can be construed to permit class arbitration, an 
arbitral tribunal would normally need to decide whether class 
proceedings justify themselves according to the types of factors 
relevant in class actions brought in federal court. Such criteria 
include not only common issues, but also a finding that the 
representatives and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect 
the class interests.  
Consolidation, on the other hand, involves independent but related 
actions, without any one individual or entity standing as 
representative for others, even if each side engages a team of 
common counsel. Consequently, concerns about the fairness of group 
representation would normally be absent.30 All of the lawsuits would 
otherwise go forward individually. Consolidation simply promotes 
efficiency.31  
The difference between “class” and “consolidated” proceedings 
was recently addressed in an appellate decision involving insurance 
arbitration, where the court essentially left the arbitral tribunal to 
decide (as an initial matter, at least) whether to consolidate several 
proceedings.32 Following Florida litigation by healthcare providers 
against every Blue Cross insurance plan in the United States, a dozen 
 
LITIG. 495 (1990); Richard Jeydel, Consolidation, Joinder and Class Actions, 57 
DISPUTE RESOL. J. 2 (Nov. 2002 – Jan. 2003). 
 30. In judicially-ordered consolidation, a judge would normally have discretion 
to consolidate without regard to the type of safeguards which impose themselves 
on class proceedings, such as the adequacy of counsel. Compare consolidation 
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 42(a), with class actions 
pursuant to Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 31. See Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 24(a). 
 32. See Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass. v. 
BCS Ins. Co., 671 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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plans requested indemnity from their captive insurer pursuant to an 
errors-and-omissions policy. Failing to get satisfaction, the plans 
filed consolidated arbitration claims against the captive, which asked 
a federal district court to order what it called “de-consolidation” of 
the proceedings.  
Declining to hear an appeal from a lower court decision appointing 
a third arbitrator, and refusing to de-consolidate the proceedings, the 
Court of Appeals addressed the special aspects of class arbitration.33 
These included the importance of determining adequacy of 
representation, and the prospect that a respondent might face one 
large claim for aggregate damages rather than simply a multiplicity 
of potential, yet unrealized, small arbitrations.  
Had the case been brought on a “class” basis, the appellate court 
seemed to accept that judicial intervention may have been 
appropriate, to ascertain whether the parties had in fact agreed to 
something other than bilateral arbitration. However, the proceedings 
at issue merely consolidated several cases that would otherwise have 
been brought individually, thus presenting no urgency to remove the 
matter from arbitral determination, subject to whatever later judicial 
review might be open under the Federal Arbitration Act for excess of 
authority.  
One final precision might be in order with respect to the exercise 
of “joining” parties in arbitration, sometimes referred to as 
“extending” the arbitration clause. Attempts to join parties to arbitral 
proceedings might be made as part of an offensive strategy, by a 
claimant seeking to add a respondent’s parent company in the hope 
of insuring assets sufficient to satisfy any award. Or the tactic might 
be defensive, by a respondent seeking the benefit of an arbitral clause 
signed by an affiliate, as a prospect more appealing than an unwanted 
 
 33. In its attempt to persuade the Court of Appeals to hear the appeal, the 
captive insurer had styled its application as a motion to compel arbitration, which 
would have been easier under Section 16(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
which permits appeal only from orders denying petitions for arbitration. The Court 
had little difficulty cutting through form to substance, and in so doing seemed to 
enjoy finding support both in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS. In passing, Judge Easterbrook also cited President Abraham 
Lincoln’s question about how many legs a donkey would have if we call its tail a 
leg. Id. The answer, of course, was only four, since calling the tail a leg did not 
make it one. 
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American jury trial.34 
In some instances the joinder might be pursued by reference to 
explicit provisions of institutional arbitration rules,35 while in other 
events may be pressed simply by reference to general principles of 
alter ego, “corporate veil” piercing, or implied agency.36 In all 
instances, however, the addition of a claimant or a respondent does 
not change the fundamental nature of the arbitration itself.  
II. AWARD VACATUR AND CONTRACT 
INTERPRETATION 
A. PARCEL TANKERS AND ANTI-TRUST 
Few matters prove as slippery as the allocation of tasks between 
judges and arbitrators in commercial disputes. A choice to arbitrate 
implicates waiver of access to otherwise competent courts in favor of 
adjudication which is both private and binding. Respect for this 
bargain means that judges normally should not disturb an arbitrator’s 
substantive conclusions.  
 
 34. The protean nature of collective arbitration has often been made even more 
complex by the term “mass” proceedings, often pressed into service for 
extraordinary events such as adjudication of Holocaust-related insurance claims 
through the ICHEIC process conducted in London, or claims to Swiss bank 
accounts through the Claims Resolution Tribunal in Zürich. See INTERNATIONAL 
MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES (Howard M. Holtzmann & Edda Kristjánsdóttir , eds., 
2007). 
 35. See, e.g., London Court of International Arbitration Rules, art. 21.1(h) 
(1998), available at http://www.lcia.org/DisputeResolutionServices/LCIA 
ArbitrationRules.aspx; International Chamber of Commerce Rules, art. 7 (2012), 
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/ 
arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/ (providing joinder procedures distinct from 
those of Article 10 related to consolidation). 
 36.  American courts, of course, are well aware of the various theories on 
which non-signatories might be joined in arbitration. See Arthur Andersen v. 
Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009) (addressing notions of third party beneficiaries). 
For an intriguing cross-Channel debate on the matter, see Dallah Real Estate & 
Tourism Holding Co. v. Gov’t of Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46. Although the British 
Supreme Court held that there was no justification to join the government of 
Pakistan, an analogous decision by the Paris Cour d’appel came to the opposite 
conclusion, dismissing a challenge to an award against the state. Cour d’appel 
[CA] de Paris, Case No. 09-28533, Feb. 17, 2011. See generally William W. Park, 
Non-Signatories and International Contract, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3 (Permanent Court of Arbitration, ed., 2009). 
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Unlike the merits of a dispute itself, however, an arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction must necessarily fall within the province of judicial 
review. No reason exists for a court to defer to arbitrators on matters 
never given to them for decision. Courts understandably hesitate to 
enforce decisions by arbitrators who have clearly ignored the 
contours of their mandate.  
This sensible delineation of tasks inheres in most modern 
arbitration statutes, including the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 
which empowers courts to vacate awards “where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers.”37 Award annulment would not be 
appropriate, however, simply because a judge disagrees with the 
award on questions of law or fact submitted to arbitration.38 
The majority decision in Stolt-Nielsen,39 although paying lip 
service to this division of labor, effectively ignored the distinction in 
their disposition of a case brought against owners of ships commonly 
known as Parcel Tankers, used to carry liquids. Alleging price-fixing 
and other anti-competitive practices,40 the shippers that had chartered 
the vessels requested a single proceeding to address their combined 
claims, borrowing the term “class action arbitration” from American 
court procedures. All shippers (the owners’ customers) had accepted 
charter parties (leases for use of the vessels) which included similar 
arbitration clauses. 
Not surprisingly, the shippers would have seen benefit to 
collective proceedings, permitting them to muster greater legal 
firepower and to reduce legal costs which in turn would enhance the 
value of bringing the litigation.41 By contrast, the owners preferred 
bilateral litigation strategy, which would have the effect of reducing 
the cost-benefit ration of the lawsuit for each claimant.  
 
 37.  9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4) (1925). 
 38.  With respect to foreign awards, Article V of the 1958 New York 
Arbitration Convention applies a similar principle, denying recognition if the 
arbitration agreement was “not valid” or the award contains decisions “beyond the 
scope of the submission to arbitration.” 
 39. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 40.  In a companion criminal case, Stolt-Nielsen itself had admitted to 
engaging in an illegal cartel. United States v. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 
586 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 41. See generally ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003). 
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After a district court had ordered the related actions to be heard 
together,42 the parties agreed to constitute a tribunal pursuant to the 
American Arbitration Association’s Supplementary Rules on Class 
Arbitration (“AAA Supplementary Rules”) to address whether the 
various arbitrations could and should proceed on a class basis.43 In a 
partial award, the arbitrators construed the arbitration clause to 
permit class arbitration, which might be ordered at a subsequent 
stage upon a finding of certain prerequisites, such as common 
questions of law and fact among the class members. That path must 
have seemed conducive to a more efficient process, with savings in 
time and cost from grouping related claims into a single case. 
B. EXCESS OF AUTHORITY  
1. The “Silent” Clause  
The asserted efficiencies in class arbitration, with savings from 
combined claims, did not impress the ship owners, who sought to 
vacate the award for excess of authority. Ultimately a majority of the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the arbitrators had exceeded their 
authority by imposing personal policy views, rather than deciding 
pursuant to applicable law.44 Accordingly, the case was remanded to 
the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s 
opinion, namely vacatur of the award.  
The Court based its conclusion on a somewhat unusual feature of 
the case, which was a post-dispute stipulation concluded by the 
parties confirming that their contracts were silent on the matter of 
 
 42. See In re Parcel Tanker Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, 296 F. 
Supp. 2d 1370, 1370-71 (J.P.M.L. 2003). 
 43. AnimalFeeds brought the claim on behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated in a putative class action under FRCP Rule 23 against Stolt-Nielsen, 
Odfjell, Jo Tankers, and Tokyo Marine. Id. at 1371; FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 44.  Justice Alito wrote:  
It is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the 
agreement and effectively ‘dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice’ that his 
decision may be unenforceable. In that situation, an arbitration decision may be 
vacated under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA on the ground that the arbitrator ‘exceeded [his] 
powers,’ for the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a contract, not to make 
public policy. In this case, we must conclude that what the arbitration panel did was 
simply to impose its own view of sound policy regarding class arbitration.  
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767-68. 
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class action arbitrations, in the sense that “no agreement” had been 
reached.  
Significantly, the Court did not say that parties must agree 
explicitly to class arbitration, but simply that the case at bar 
implicated no agreement, whether express or implied. Indeed, the 
Court added in a significant footnote “We have no occasion to decide 
what contractual basis may support a finding that the parties agreed 
to authorize class-action arbitration.”45 Consequently, not all 
arbitration clauses which are silent on class actions need be 
interpreted by federal courts as prohibiting class actions, at least 
absent a stipulation like the one in Stolt-Nielsen to the effect of “no 
agreement” on the matter.46 
A strong dissent authored by Justice Ginsburg contended that the 
arbitrators were simply doing what the parties had instructed them. 
The AAA Supplementary Rules, accepted by all litigants, 
empowered arbitrators to decide whether the dispute should proceed 
on a class action basis.47  
Under the facts of Stolt-Nielsen, the dissent’s argument has 
significant force. No question was raised about the bona fide of the 
counsel representing the claimant shippers. All claimants appear to 
have agreed to arbitration with all respondents, leaving open 
however the question whether the arbitration should proceed on a 
 
 45. See id. at 1776 n.10. 
 46. See Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113 (2nd Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012). A group of retail sales employees filed a 
discrimination claim against their employer. The Court of Appeals held that the 
arbitrator did not exceed her authority in determining that arbitration agreement 
permitted employees to proceed with their effort to certify class in arbitration 
proceedings against employer. 
 47. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1777 
(2010). Rule 3 of these AAA Supplementary Rules grants the arbitrators 
jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitration might, as a matter of contract, 
proceed on behalf of a class, assuming satisfaction of the relevant criteria for class 
certification set forth in Rule 4, which parallel factors in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See American Arbitration Association, AAA’s Supplementary Rules 
for Class Arbitration Rules 3 & 4, available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ 
faces/rules/searchrules/rulesdetail?doc=ADRSTG_004129&_afrLoop=161453029
587710&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=fmy0ltmjz_171#%40%3F_afrWin
dowId%3Dfmy0ltmjz_171%26_afrLoop%3D161453029587710%26doc%3DADR
STG_004129%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dfmy0ltmjz_223 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2012); see alsoFED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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bilateral or a collective basis. Given that arbitration remains a 
creature of contract, there was nothing odd in the parties deciding to 
craft the scope of questions to be submitted to the arbitral tribunal, 
which through incorporation of the AAA Rules included 
interpretation of controverted charter-party contracts. One side said 
the contract language did permit class proceedings, to which “not so” 
was effectively the other side’s reply.  
Not all cases yield to such analysis however. One can imagine, for 
example, significant complications from an agreement to arbitrate 
the matter of class entitlement, but concluded by a self-appointed 
representative which did not in fact speak for a class, a matter 
discussed more fully below.  
2. The Right Answer to the Wrong Question 
In its zeal to send a signal on the admittedly problematic nature of 
class action arbitration, the majority conflated two distinct matters. 
The first relates to monitoring arbitral jurisdiction, which falls to 
courts. The second concerns substantive merits of the parties’ 
dispute, which falls to arbitrators.48  
The opinion by Justice Alito rightly noted the parties’ post-dispute 
stipulation that the contract was silent in the sense of containing “no 
agreement” on class action arbitration. However, the litigants had 
unequivocally asked arbitrators, not judges to construe their ex ante 
intent on class arbitration.49 Article 3 of the AAA Supplementary 
Rules, titled “Construction of the Arbitration Clause,” provides the 
arbitrators with an explicit grant of jurisdiction as follows:  
Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold matter, in 
a reasoned, partial final award on the construction of the arbitration 
clause, whether the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to 
proceed on behalf of or against a class (the “Clause Construction 
Award”).50 
 
 48.  See generally William W. Park, The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine 
Jurisdiction, in 13 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 55 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed., 
2007). 
 49. Brief in Opposition at 2, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 
S. Ct. 1758, 1768 (2010). 
 50.  American Arbitration Association, supra note 47. Moreover, Rule 3 
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The arbitrators were thus empowered by the parties to address 
whether the arbitration clause permitted the case to proceed on behalf 
of a class.51 The litigants moved that question to the realm of the 
dispute’s substance, which under the FAA normally remains within 
the purview of the arbitrators.  
In essence, the majority gave the right answer to the wrong 
question. The relevant inquiry facing the Court was not, “What did 
the parties agree in general?” but the more limited issue, “What did 
the parties agree to arbitrate?” By accepting the AAA Supplementary 
Rules, the parties gave to the arbitrators the question of whether the 
contract allowed class action arbitration, thus generally precluding 
judicial second-guessing on that matter.52 Courts might still intervene 
to monitor bias or lack of due process, but not to correct a simple 
mistake in the arbitrators’ contract interpretation.53  
The chief mischief of Stolt-Nielsen lies in its potential to decrease 
the finality of commercial arbitration, defeating the parties’ aim that 
their dispute be decided by arbitrators rather than courts. Few would 
disagree that arbitrators must remain faithful to the parties’ contract, 
not create new public policy.54 Unfortunately, the majority opinion 
 
recognizes that such a determination will be considered an award subject to review 
pursuant to the delineated grounds for vacatur, but no more, as provided in the 
FAA. The point of Rule 3 is to construe the contract, as a threshold matter, to 
determine whether the parties agreed to submit their dispute to class arbitration at 
all. 
 51.  The applicability of these AAA procedures was explicitly recognized by 
the majority. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765. 
 52. For an example of a decision following this line of argument, see Southern 
Comm. Serv., Inc. v. Thomas, 829 F. Supp 2d 1324 (N.D. GA 2011), in which the 
District Court held that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority because, “the 
parties . . . specifically granted the arbitrator the power to interpret their agreement 
and decide whether it authorized class actions, both in writing and by their 
conduct.” Id. at 1337. 
 53. See John M. Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Class Arbitration, 2011 AAA 
Y.B. ON ARB. & L. 395, 407 (2011) (opining that “The Supreme Court simply felt 
that the arbitrators got the answer wrong, but the statute provides no basis for a 
court to correct a mere error on the part of arbitrators”); see also S. I. Strong, 
Opening More Doors Than It Closes, 2010 LLOYD’S MAR. & CONSUMER L.Q. 565 
(Nov. 2010), for a scholarly perspective on the effect of Stolt-Nielsen in future 
cases. 
 54.  The Stolt-Nielsen majority opinion at 1767-68 declared that the award 
must be vacated because the tribunal simply “impose[d] its own view of sound 
policy regarding class arbitration.” 
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took that general proposition as an avenue to justify award 
annulment simply because the arbitrators got it wrong on a question 
submitted for their determination. In doing so, the Court ruled on a 
substantive issue within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, thus exceeding 
the judiciary’s own legitimate role in the process.  
In this connection, one must again note what the Court did not do. 
No suggestion was made that collective action constitutes a non-
arbitrable process by reason of some public policy for which the 
judiciary serves as guardian. Nor did the Court find that claimants’ 
counsel would not adequately represent the interests of all shippers in 
the proceedings. Rather, the decision rested purely on a divergent 
interpretation of the contract language, with the reviewing judges 
reading the charter-parties differently from the arbitrators.  
3. Substantive Merits vs. Arbitral Authority 
In holding that the award should be vacated, the majority invoked 
excess of authority by the arbitral tribunal, one of the limited 
statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA.55 Under the facts of the 
case, however, the Court may well have blurred the distinction 
between excess of jurisdiction and simple mistake of law, dressing 
the latter in the garb of the former.  
True enough, articulating a robust definition of excess of authority 
has often proved tenuous.56 On the basis that litigants do not 
expressly empower arbitrators to make mistakes, at least one judge 
has gone so far as to suggest that errors always constitute an excess 
of authority.57  
Such a stretch, however, ignores that the parties asked an 
arbitrator, not a judge, to decide the case, thus assuming the risk that 
 
 55.  The exclusivity of the FAA as the source for vacatur grounds was declared 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 
576 (2008). 
 56. Attempts to define jurisdiction sometimes bring to mind the line by U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, admitting an inability to define “hard core” 
obscenity but adding, “I know it when I see it.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 
197 (1964). 
 57. The great English jurist Lord Denning once suggested (albeit in an 
administrative context) that “Whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law it goes 
outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void.” See LORD 
DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW 74 (1979). 
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the arbitrator might get it wrong. Nothing in the FAA permits judges 
to impose their own views on matters submitted to arbitration. The 
integrity of the arbitral process requires not only that judges 
scrutinize gateway questions related to the contours of the litigants’ 
agreement to arbitrate, but equally that courts respect the arbitrators’ 
decisions on issues given to them for adjudication.  
One might draw a distinction between two types of legitimacy. 
The first being legitimacy of the arbitral process, which might be 
threatened by arbitrators who exceed their consent-based jurisdiction. 
A second level of legitimacy relates to the role of the judiciary. A 
court can and should intervene to ensure the procedural fairness of 
hearings, in matters such as the right to be heard and respect for the 
arbitrator’s mission. However, when courts begin second guessing an 
arbitrator’s decision on the substance of the dispute entrusted to him 
by the litigants, arbitration awards cease to have the bargained-for 
finality expected by the litigants.  
In this context, one may recall words used from an earlier U.S. 
Supreme Court decision addressing a dispute between a New York 
merchant and an Illinois store owner before arbitrators who 
ultimately awarded damages to the ill-treated storekeeper. Having 
lost in arbitration, the unhappy New Yorker succeeded in having the 
award set aside by a lower court. The Supreme Court reversed with 
the following reasoning:  
If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of 
the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity 
will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course 
would be a substitution of the judgment of the chancellor [the judiciary] 
in place of the judges chosen by the parties [the arbitrators], and would 
make an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation.58 
To extend jurisdictional analysis further than allowed pursuant to 
the FAA would permit any unhappy loser in a fair proceeding to 
renege on the bargain to arbitrate simply when a decision proves not 
to their liking. 
There is nothing unusual in saying that parties express their intent 
to arbitrate matters which might otherwise be jurisdictional in nature. 
 
 58.  Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1855). 
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For example, allegations that the signature in an arbitration clause 
had been forged would normally give rise to a judicial review. Yet it 
would always be up to the parties to agree that the allegation of 
forgery should be arbitrated,59 in which case the arbitrator would be 
the one to determine the genuineness of the signature.60  
At some point, of course, arbitrators might simply invent a legal 
standard informed only by their personal policy preferences.61 In 
such an instance, they would be exceeding their authority and 
detracting from arbitral legitimacy.  
The facts of Stolt-Nielsen, however, do not lend themselves to 
painting the arbitrators as such wild cards. Although the Court’s 
aversion to class arbitration proceedings may be understandable, the 
parties asked the arbitrators, not the courts, to construe their 
agreement by their adoption of the AAA Supplementary Rules. The 
arbitrators’ understanding of the law had been made on the basis of 
the earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision where a mere plurality of the 
Court held that determinations on consolidation were for the 
arbitrators themselves. 62 The legacy of this case was anything but 
clear. None of the four opinions commanded a majority. 
Although stressing that the award was not yet “ripe” for review, 
the opinion by Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the effect of the 
agreement to apply the AAA Supplementary Rules. Her dissent 
notes, “The parties’ supplemental agreement, referring the class-
 
 59. With respect to the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate (such as 
raised by the allegations of forgery), a separate post-dispute agreement to arbitrate 
would normally be needed to confer arbitral jurisdiction. By contrast, with respect 
to procedural matters (such as respect for time limits) the parties might well confer 
arbitral authority in a single contract containing a clear mandate to arbitrate. See 
Howsam v. Dean Witter, 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (addressing the right to interpret a 
requirement that arbitration be filed within six years after “the occurrence or event 
giving rise to the dispute”). 
 60.  Such delegation of jurisdictional authority in a separate agreement is 
exactly what happened in Astro Valiente Compania Naviera v. Pakistan Ministry 
of Food & Agriculture (The Emmanuel Colocotronis No. 2), [1982], 1 All E. R. 
823, [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 286 (QB Comm. Ct.) . 
 61.  The sting in the majority’s vacatur of the award lies in the line, “what the 
arbitration panel did was simply to impose its own view of sound policy regarding 
class arbitration.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 
1767-68 (2010). 
 62.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
  
858 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:4 
 
arbitration issue to an arbitration panel, undoubtedly empowered the 
arbitrators to render their clause-construction decision. That scarcely 
debatable point should resolve this case.”63 Put differently, the job of 
construing the contract’s scope on the matter of class arbitration had 
been expressly conferred on arbitrators, not judges.  
C. OPT-IN FOR CLASS MEMBERS  
The calculus for judicial intervention changes, however, if no 
subsequent agreement exists to refer the matter to construction 
pursuant to the AAA Supplementary Rules. Under the factual matrix 
of Stolt-Nielsen, everyone had in fact signed arbitration agreements. 
In such circumstances, the dangers, milder in magnitude when 
speaking in relative terms, were simply that arbitrators might 
erroneously presume an intent to permit collective (rather than 
bilateral) proceedings among entities that had already consented to 
renouncing their recourse to courts. The greater disruption lurks in 
the possible extension of class proceedings to include persons who 
never signed arbitration agreements at all, most likely the next step 
for those who press to import true American-style class proceedings 
into arbitration.64  
The AAA Supplementary Rules provide criteria for class 
 
 63. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1780. The plurality felt that the arbitrator should 
decide whether the parties’ agreement allowed for class action arbitration. Justice 
Stevens concurred with the outcome but did not endorse its reasoning. The dissent 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the parties’ contract demonstrated no 
consent to class action arbitration. The dissent by Justice Thomas noted that the 
case originated before South Carolina states courts, and contended that the FAA 
did not apply to state proceedings. In the context of the point made by Justice 
Thomas, it is interesting that Stolt-Nielsen implicated a maritime matter, falling 
within the purview of federal rather than state law. 
 64.  Statutory court-ordered consolidation of arbitral proceedings is a different 
matter, given that all parties would presumably be subject to the relevant judicial 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 2A (2010), allowing 
consolidation as provided in the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which in 
Rule 42 permits joinder of actions “involving a common question of law or fact.” 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 42 (2008). The provision was applied in New England Energy v. 
Keystone Shipping, 855 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988), which held that a federal district 
court could grant consolidation pursuant to Massachusetts state law where the 
parties’ agreement was silent on such matter. See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 
7N1/2 (1998), requiring non-voluntary arbitration of claims over allegedly 
defective vehicles. 
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certification, setting forth factors that largely parallel those in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23. If arbitrators have found 
that the contract permits class action arbitration, they will proceed to 
determine whether the various proceedings should go forward on a 
class basis. Pursuant to prerequisites in Article 4 of those 
Supplementary Rules, one or more claimants may represent a class 
only if each of the following conditions is met:  
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of separate arbitrations on behalf 
of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class; (5) counsel selected to represent the class will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class; and (6) each class member has entered 
into an agreement containing an arbitration clause which is substantially 
similar to that signed by the class representative(s) and each of the other 
class members.  
The final prerequisite of Rule 4(6) speaks of each class member 
having entered into an agreement containing an arbitration clause 
substantially similar to the one signed by the class representative. 
The sounder approach to such language will be to require a true 
bilateral arbitration clause, not simply a unilateral post-dispute “opt-
in” process. Lacking reciprocity, a unilateral “opt-in” would derogate 
from the abecedarian principle that arbitration (unlike court 
proceedings) presupposes genuine consent, not simply post-dispute 
attachment to a class for litigation convenience.  
Under the facts of Stolt-Nielsen, all owners and all customers had 
agreed to arbitrate with each other through clauses in the charter-
parties.65 No question had been raised about the good faith or 
adequacy of the counsel representing the class in proceedings which 
simply moved things from bilateral to multilateral proceedings, 
without deeming into life an agreement to arbitrate where none had 
existed.  
Class arbitration would change dramatically, however, if a 
unilateral “opt-in” process were to bring into the arbitration potential 
claimants with which respondents had never concluded any 
 
 65. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765. 
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arbitration agreement at all. Like marriage, commercial arbitration 
implicates mutual consent, not an open-ended option to be exercised 
by a host of partners.  
III. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT  
AND CLASS ACTION WAIVERS 
A. AT&T MOBILITY AND THE NATURE OF ARBITRATION 
In Stolt-Nielsen an arbitral award had been rendered, with the 
courts coming into the act to second guess the arbitrators’ decision. 
By contrast, judges may sometimes preclude arbitrators from ever 
hearing a matter at all, as happened when the validity of class actions 
waivers was called into question in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. 66 
In a consumer complaint against the manufacturer of cell phones, 
the standard-form sales contracts provided for arbitration but 
prohibited class proceedings. Relying on an earlier California 
judicial ruling striking down such prohibitions as unconscionable, 
the district court refused to compel arbitration.  
The Supreme Court reversed, saying that the Federal Arbitration 
Act preempted state rules barring class-action waivers. Whether 
right or wrong, the majority opinion by Justice Scalia tended to 
obscure intellectually rigorous debate by suggesting that any switch 
from bilateral to class arbitration “sacrificed the principal 
advantage of arbitration—its informality.”67 He then noted that 
class arbitration requires procedural formality, to ensure adequate 
representation of absent class members, notice to absent members, 
and an opportunity to opt out, before concluding that Congress 
would not have left the imposition of such procedural requirements 
to an arbitrator.68  
One can only speculate on where, in the Federal Arbitration Act 
or its legislative history, support might be found for such a single-
 
 66. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), 563 U.S. -- 
(2011). 
 67. 131 S.Ct. at 1751. 
 68. The majority also noted, quite rightly, the risk of error increases during 
class proceedings, yet glossed over the many high-stakes arbitrations that already 
occur. 
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dimension view of the arbitral process, particularly in a world 
with a multitude of publications witnessing to arbitration of large 
multinational contract disputes and the increasingly public field of 
investor-state arbitration pursuant to bilateral investment treaties 
and free trade agreements. On its face at least, the Federal 
Arbitration Act says simply that arbitration agreements will be 
enforced according to their terms, whether such agreements relate 
to big contracts or small.  
A sounder underpinning for the decision might have rested on 
the observation that the state-law doctrine invalidating class-
action waivers (the so-called “Discovery Bank” rule) required 
certain categories of disputes to be litigated in court, rather than 
arbitrated. It was precisely this type of state “non-arbitrability” 
rules that the Federal Arbitration Act was intended to preempt.69  
Although Justice Scalia did not provide much guidance on 
whether “manifest disregard of the law” continued as a separate 
ground for award vacatur, his opinion did cite the limited nature 
of judicial review as another ground for invalidating class- 
action waivers. According to the majority opinion, “We find it 
hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no 
effective means of review, and even harder to believe that 
Congress would have intended to allow state courts to force such a 
decision.”70 
The thoughtful concurrence by Justice Thomas provided what 
may be a more persuasive approach, looking first to Federal 
Arbitration Act Section 2 which makes an arbitration agreement 
valid except on grounds that may exist for contract revocation. 
He read that provision in tandem with Section 4, which calls for 
courts to compel arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.” Construing the two sections together, the 
concurrence suggests that only state law contract defenses 
concerning formation of the arbitration agreement (such as fraud 
or duress) could serve as a basis to decline enforcement of the 
 
 69.  Id. at 1752. The opinion by Justice Scalia did mention that Section 10 of 
the Federal Arbitration Act “focuses on misconduct rather than mistake” thus 
perhaps suggesting that any residual “manifest disregard” must be found as a 
subset of the excess of authority. 
 70. Id. 
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clause.71  
The dissent by Justice Breyer stressed the advantages of class 
arbitration, and argued that the California rule on waivers fell 
within the role accorded to state law in determining the validity 
of arbitration agreements.72 Asking rhetorically what rational 
lawyer would have agreed to represent the named claimants in 
the case, for the possibility of recovering $30.22 in damages, the 
dissent concluded that the alternative to class action would not 
be millions of individual actions, but none at all.73  
B. LOWER COURT REACTIONS 
1. Amex Merchants 
Such decisions on class arbitration have already resulted in push-
back from lower courts. In a multiple-stage antitrust case brought by 
merchants against a charge-card issuer, the Second Circuit 
invalidated class-action waivers in arbitration even after two remands 
for reconsideration.74  
The named claimants, companies in California and New York as 
well as a national trade association, sought to represent all merchants 
which had agreed to accept Amex cards. Although happy for the 
business from “charge” cards (simply a means of payment), the 
merchants objected to having to honor “credit” cards permitting 
customers to finance purchases over time, apparently issued to a less-
affluent group of customers than the charge card holders. Claimants 
argued that the Amex “Honor All Cards” policy constituted an illegal 
“tying” arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
The American Express card acceptance agreements allowed either 
side to resolve claims by arbitration. However, the contracts also 
provided that the choice of arbitration by either side precluded the 
 
 71. Id. at 1754. 
 72. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. 
 74.  In re American Express Merchants Litigation, (“Amex I”), 554 F.3d 300 
(2d Cir. 2009); In Re American Express Merchants Litigation (“Amex II”), 634 
F.3d 187 (2d Circ. 2011); In re American Express Merchants Litigation (“Amex 
III”), 667 F.3d 204(2d Cir. 2012). 
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merchant from participating “in a representative capacity or as a 
member of any class of claimants” during the arbitration 
proceedings.  
Rightly or wrongly, the appellate court found that the high cost of 
“bilateral” arbitration would effectively preclude vindication of 
statutory rights. On the first reconsideration, directed in light of Stolt-
Nielsen, as well as its second reconsideration, following AT&T 
Mobility, the Second Circuit found its original analysis unaffected, 
and declared the arbitration clause unenforceable. Relying on 
testimony of an economist who opined that the cost of an economic 
antitrust study might fall between “several thousand dollars” and “in 
excess of $1 million” the Court found the arbitration clause 
unenforceable.75 
An order to arbitrate on a class-action basis was not an option in 
light of Stolt-Nielsen, which requires agreement on the matter. Thus 
the Second Circuit simply concluded that the arbitration clause itself 
was unenforceable, and remanded to the district court with 
instructions to deny the motion to compel arbitration. In doing so the 
appellate court was careful not to suggest that all class-action 
waivers were to be deemed per se unenforceable. Rather, its analysis 
rested on the proposition that in the instant case the only 
economically feasible means for enforcing rights under competition 
law via class action. If the arbitration clause precluded such 
proceedings, then the agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable.  
Such an approach leaves litigants in a difficult position. If a 
contract contains a class-action waiver, a judge is unable to compel 
class proceedings. Yet the same judge might feel unable to grant a 
motion for non-class arbitration, considering bilateral proceedings to 
be unconscionable because the cost denies claimant an ability to 
enforce statutory rights on an individual basis. The dilemma is 
certain to stimulate practitioners to focus more on drafting arbitration 
clauses,76 whether within the framework of consumer transactions or 
 
 75. In re American Express Merchants Litigation (“Amex III”), 667 F.3d 204, 
212 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing testimony from one Gary L. French, Ph.D.). 
 76. See Paul Friedland & Michael Ottolenghi, Drafting Class Action Clauses 
After Stolt-Nielsen, 65 DISPUTE RESOL. J. 22 (May-October 2010), who suggest 
explicitly addressing the question of class action arbitration in the arbitration 
clause to avoid any confusion resulting from how future courts will interpret Stolt-
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business-to-business contracts.77  
2. Choice-of-Law Principles 
In an interesting case decided as this essay goes to press, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeal addressed the interaction of class action 
waivers and choice-of-law rules.78 A federal district court sitting in 
the state of Washington had refused to compel arbitration and struck 
down an arbitration clause requiring bilateral arbitration, finding the 
clause “substantively” unconscionable pursuant to a Washington 
state law invalidating class action waivers in arbitration.  
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit held that federal law preempted state 
law invalidating the class-action waiver. However, the case was 
remanded so that the lower court could examine procedural 
unconscionability, related to general contract defenses such as fraud 
and duress, not specific to arbitration.  
The parties’ agreement had provided for application of the law of 
the state of the plaintiff’s billing address. Consequently, the district 
court was directed to examine the choice-of-law rules in Washington 
applicable to the procedural unconscionability arguments, which had 
not earlier been addressed.  
IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
Evaluating the recent class-action cases remains a daunting task, 
both descriptively and normatively. If scholars could predict the 
future they would likely be in another business. In particular, the 
peculiar facts of Stolt-Nielsen limit its precedential value, given that 
 
Nielsen. 
 77. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent noted that the parties in Stolt-Nielsen were 
sophisticated businesses with sufficient resources and experience to bargain, rather 
than parties subject to contracts of adhesion. Whether this argument cuts in favor 
or against a presumption to allow class action arbitration remains an open question. 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1783 (2010).  
 78. Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012), reversing the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Washington. Federal courts exercising 
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship apply the choice-of-law rules of the 
forum state. Thus the district court was directed to look to the conflicts principles 
of the state of Washington. 
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the decision rests on an explicit “no agreement” stipulation not likely 
to be repeated if the parties resisting class arbitration have competent 
counsel.  
The great risk of Stolt-Nielsen is that its approach will be pressed 
into service to justify award annulment in cases where judges differ 
with arbitrators on the substantive outcome of a case. Indeed, the 
decision enhances the prospect that arbitration will become mere 
foreplay to litigation, given how the Supreme Court ignored the 
litigants’ explicit agreement to submit to arbitration the very question 
of whether class proceedings were authorized.  
Likewise, the case will provide little guidance on factors that 
might demonstrate the parties’ intent to permit class arbitration. In a 
key footnote, the majority in Stolt-Nielsen punts to future decisions 
the important question of how to define the contours of an agreement 
to class action proceedings, stating, “We have no occasion to decide 
what contractual basis may support a finding that the parties agreed 
to authorize class-action arbitration.”79  
Nor will the Court’s discussion assist in addressing the much 
vexed matter of whether “manifest disregard of the law” continues to 
exist as an independent ground for review of arbitral awards.80 Stolt-
Nielsen says that if such a standard exists, it was satisfied under the 
facts of the case, thus leaving the vitality of the doctrine open to 
question.81 In AT&T Mobility Justice Scalia does provide a 
 
 79. See Stolt-Nielsen 130 S. Ct. at 1782, n.10. 
 80. First introduced in dictum of the 1953 U.S. Supreme Court decision Wilko 
v. Swann, “manifest disregard of the law” has raised considerable concern in some 
quarters. See, e.g., the opinion by Chief Judge Posner in Baravati v. Josephthal, 
Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7 Cir. 1994), which refers to the doctrine as 
having been “[c]reated ex nihilo [as] a nonstatutory ground for setting aside arbitral 
awards.” Judge Posner, continued: “If [manifest disregard] is meant to smuggle 
review for clear error in by the back door, it is inconsistent with the entire modern 
law of arbitration. If it is intended to be synonymous with the statutory formula 
that it most nearly resembles—whether the arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers’—it 
is superfluous and confusing.” Id. 
 81. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3: “We do not decide whether 
‘manifest disregard’ survives … as an independent ground for review or as a 
judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.” 
The Court then continued, “Assuming, arguendo, that such a standard applies, we 
find it satisfied for the reasons that follow [in the majority opinion].” Whether 
“manifest disregard of the law” exists as an independent ground for judicial review 
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tantalizing hint, saying that Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
“focuses on misconduct rather than mistake” thus perhaps suggesting 
that any residual “manifest disregard” must be found as a subset of 
the excess of authority.82  
Whether judges outside the United States will stay court actions in 
conflict with class arbitration remains equally unclear. In the context 
of litigation in France or England, for example, it is far from evident 
that a court would refuse to hear a claim merely because the 
respondent, benefiting from no pre-existing arbitration agreement, 
had simply opted into American class arbitration.  
V. CONCLUSION: EFFICIENCY AND CONSENT 
Debate over class action arbitration highlights a stubborn tension 
in binding private dispute resolution. Collective action sometimes 
promotes a form of efficiency in the vindication of rights which 
enhances arbitration’s role in promoting economic cooperation. Yet 
the legitimacy of the arbitral process depends on having claims 
decided in a manner consistent with the limits of arbitral authority 
contained in the parties’ consent, respect for which does not always 
marry well with consent-based legitimacy.  
Human nature being what it is, the character of the substantive 
claims to be decided often affects how competing considerations get 
weighed in resolving this tension between efficiency and consent-
based legitimacy. Rightly or wrongly, claims of consumer fraud and 
employment discrimination evoke different “a priori” sympathies 
from those triggered by actions to enforce the rights of creditors or 
investors. Not infrequently, political, social and cultural 
predispositions affect how we balance costs and benefits of rival 
reactions to a perceived injustice. 
In the domestic American context, collective arbitration may pit 
consumers against manufacturers, workers against their bosses, 
shippers against vessel owners. For the claimants, class proceedings 
provide as a more efficient path to recover damages for alleged 
fraud, unfair dismissal, or overcharging. Not surprisingly, the 
 
of awards was put into doubt by the 2008 Supreme Court decision in Hall Street 
Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 82. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).  
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manufacturer, employer or ship owner, on the receiving end of the 
complaints, may see the process as a form of litigation terrorism 
conducted mainly to benefit the plaintiffs’ lawyers.  
A different color often attaches to collective arbitration in the 
international realm. The claimants might be well-heeled bondholders 
alleging expropriation of financial holdings by a developing 
country,83 or venerable institutional investors asserting shareholders’ 
rights against a large foreign oil company said to have close ties with 
the Kremlin.84  
In each instance, arbitrators asked to interpret the contracts, as 
well as judges who review the awards and scholars who volunteer 
comment, may tend to evaluate procedural constraints of party 
consent in light of conscious or unconscious ideological inclinations. 
In this context, recourse to imprecise terms such as “left” and “right” 
will foster helpful analysis only if those labels serve as categories 
which beg for, rather than provide, enlightenment.  
In the end, however, the health of arbitration will depend more on 
honest and mature debate than on ideology or dogma. In resolving 
tensions between efficiency and legitimacy, the soundest suggestions 
will remain imperfect, given that any proposal rests on words 
connected sequentially even while the reality of the conflict remains 
obstinately simultaneous in nature.  
During the proceedings, arbitrators must be vigilant to respect 
constraints in the parties’ agreement that might limit the format of 
arbitration to individual rather than collective claims. After the 
arbitration itself has ended, judges reviewing the award should 
remember that in the post-award stage of the arbitral process, the role 
of law consists principally in promoting the rule of law, in the sense 
of respect for fundamental to procedural fairness. Judicial 
enthusiasm for insuring the “right result” in contract construction 
should not normally outweigh the deference due to the arbitrators’ 
good faith resolution of the questions entrusted to them by the 
litigants.  
 
 
 83. See discussion of the Abaclat case, supra note 24. 
 84. See JSC Surgutneflegaz v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 167 
Fed. Appx. 266 (2d Cir. 2006). 
